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A SHORT HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
SENTENCING: TOO LITTLE LAW, TOO 
MUCH LAW, OR JUST RIGHT 
JUDGE NANCY GERTNER*
For the centennial of this renowned Journal, I have been asked to tell 
the history of American sentencing—concisely, to be sure.  The history of 
sentencing in the United States can be recounted from a number of 
perspectives.  First, there is an institutional story—the story of the division 
of labor between all of the sentencing players.  Sentencing is, after all, a 
system; sentencing institutions work in relation to, and not independent of, 
one another.  Players in the sentencing system include the traditional ones: 
judges, lawyers—both prosecutors and defense—as well as the Congress, 
the public, sometimes the jury, and most recently, administrative agencies.  
Second, and as a corollary of that division of labor, sentencing can be 
examined through the different sources of its rules and standards, which can 
be common law rules crafted by judges, statutes drafted by legislatures, 
regulations promulgated by agencies, or standards articulated by academic 
experts, like penologists, sociologists, political scientists—the kind of 
scholars who write in this estimable Journal. 
 
Third, sentencing can be viewed through the lens of the changing 
substantive law, reflecting the shifting winds of penal theory, from 
rehabilitation, retribution, and deterrence, to incapacitation, and various 
permutations of each.  Different theories of sentencing, in turn, confer 
power on different sentencing players.  For example, rehabilitation theories 
necessarily enhanced the role of judges and parole officers, the purported 
experts in individualized punishment aimed at “curing” deviant behavior.  
Retributive theories did the same for Congress and the public, not to 
mention radio “shock jocks” and 24/7 cable television pundits.  If the most 
important question was the culpability of the offender—what punishment 
this crime deserved—everyone was suddenly an expert, or so it seemed. 
 
* Judge Nancy Gertner is a judge of the District of Massachusetts, appointed in April 
1994.  In addition, Judge Gertner has been teaching a year-long seminar on sentencing at the 
Yale Law School for the past decade. 
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Finally, the political entity in whose name the punishment is imposed 
is critical: most law enforcement is the province of the state.  A national 
federal sentencing system, owing to what some have called the 
“federalization” of crime,1 has far different pressures—few financial 
pressures (the federal government prints money, after all), and many more 
political pressures—than a state one, and necessarily produces a different 
sentencing regime. 
This Article will range over the various stages of American sentencing 
over time, focusing mostly on federal sentencing, and having these issues in 
mind—division of labor, source of sentencing standards, substantive law, 
and federal-state divisions and their shifting permutations. 
I. COLONIAL JURIES AND SENTENCING 
In colonial times, and particularly in the period before American 
independence, juries were de facto sentencers with substantial power.2  
Many crimes were capital offenses.3  The result was binary—guilty and 
death, or not guilty and freedom.  There were few scalable punishments, or 
punishments involving a term of years.4  This is so because penitentiaries 
were not common until the end of the eighteenth century.5  Jurors plainly 
understood the impact of a guilty verdict on the defendant because of the 
relative simplicity of the criminal law and its penalty structure, and often 
because of the process by which they were selected.  They were picked 
from the rolls of white men with property.  Indeed, steps were sometimes 
taken to secure better qualified people to serve on juries.  Juries were hardly 
representative in the sense that we understand today.6  The substantive 
criminal law was the province of the states, and was, for the most part, state 
 
1 See Michael E. Horowitz & April Oliver, Foreword: The State of Federal Prosecution, 
43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1033, 1039-40 (2006). 
2 See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in 
the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 869-76 (1994) (reviewing early jury trials); Judge 
Nancy Gertner, Circumventing Juries, Undermining Justice: Lessons from Criminal Trials 
and Sentencing, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 419, 424 (1999). 
3 Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencing for Felony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 
821, 832-33 (1968). 
4 While Langbein describes this development in terms of the English jury system, his 
observations apply with special force to the colonial jury.  See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE 
ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 64 (2003). 
5 SOL RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION 27-30 (1973). 
6 Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 432 (1996). 
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common law, often deriving from cases with which the jurors were 
familiar.7 
Like the modern jury, colonial jurors were authorized to give a general 
verdict without explanation, but unlike the modern jury, the colonial jury 
was explicitly permitted to find both the facts and the law.8  If capital 
punishment were inappropriate, they would simply decline to find guilt, or 
find the defendant guilty of a lesser crime in order to avoid the penalty of 
death.9  No one disparaged this as “jury nullification.”  Ignoring the law to 
effect a more lenient outcome was well within the jury’s role.10  In fact, 
several colonies explicitly provided for jury sentencing.11 
 
7 Lance Cassack & Milton Heumann, Old Wine in New Bottles: A Reconsideration of 
Informing Jurors about Punishment in Determinate- and Mandatory-Sentencing Cases, 
4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 411, 439-40 (2007) (citing J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE 
COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800 (1986)). 
8 Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).  As 
Professor Amar noted: 
[I]t was widely believed in late eighteenth-century America that the jury, when rendering a 
general verdict, could take upon itself the right to decide both law and fact.  So said a unanimous 
Supreme Court in one of its earliest cases (decided before Callender) [Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794)] in language that resonates with the writings of some of the most 
eminent American lawyers of the age—Jefferson, Adams, and Wilson, to mention just three.  
Indeed, Chase himself went out of his way to concede that juries were judges of law as well as of 
fact.  Perhaps, however, this concession had to do with the pecularities of sedition law and its 
somewhat unusual procedures—driven, it will be recalled, by the struggle between judge and 
jury. 
Id. at 1193; see, e.g., R. J. Farley, Instructions to Juries—Their Role in the Judicial Process, 
42 YALE L.J. 194, 303 (1932) (“In America by the time of the Revolution and for some time 
thereafter, the power to decide the law in criminal cases seems to have been almost 
universally accorded the jury . . . .”); see also David A. Pepper, Nullifying History: Modern-
Day Misuse of the Right to Decide the Law, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 609 (2000) 
(arguing that colonial juries had the right to decide the law as outlined by the Court); cf. 
Edith Guild Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289 
(1966) (distinguishing between civil and criminal juries, and dismissing Brailsford as 
anomalous).  But see Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to 
Determine the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 131 (1998) 
(suggesting that the historical record is not clear). 
9 RUBIN, supra note 5, at 31. 
10 Blackstone called the jury practice of convicting of a lesser charge to mitigate against 
the death penalty as “pious perjury.”  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 239; see also THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO 
CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY, 1200-1800 295 (1985); 
LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 234-35. 
11 There is some disagreement as to how widespread jury sentencing was in non-capital 
cases at the time of the Constitution’s ratification.  Compare Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury 
Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 
1775, 1790 (1999) (“Jury sentencing in noncapital cases was a colonial innovation.”), with 
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1506 (2001) 
(“American juries at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights played a minor role in 
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Thus, in the colonial division of labor, juries had a preeminent role.12  
There was no need for a priori punishment standards or rules, because there 
was, for the most part, a single punishment.  Penal philosophy, at least as a 
formal matter, was retributive.  There was little national federal law, even 
after independence.  Most criminal law derived from the common law and 
in time, statutes from state legislatures—law with which jurors were 
familiar.13  
II. THE ERA OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING 
The turn of the nineteenth century brought scalable punishments—
penitentiaries and, in time, reformatories—and thus, a more complex set of 
sentencing outcomes.14  The jury could no longer link conviction to a 
particular sentence even if it had the power to sentence or decide questions 
of law—and it did not.  Now, they were explicitly instructed to find only 
the facts; judges determined the applicable law.  Federal substantive 
criminal law began to evolve, although most criminal prosecutions were 
still state-based.  And the jury changed: it was more diverse as barriers to 
serving as jurors were lifted for minorities and women, as were property 
restrictions.15  With more and more access to education, a professional class 
of judges and lawyers evolved, and with it, the power of the jury declined, 
including the power to affect the sentence.16  
Over time, a different division of labor evolved as between judges and 
juries: juries decided liability; judges sentenced.  Selection procedures 
sought to insure that the jury would be selected in direct proportion to what 
they did not know about the issues, or the parties.17  And that was not too 
 
sentencing.”).  Lanni reports that “as recently as three decades ago more than one-quarter of 
U.S. states provided for jury sentencing in noncapital cases.”  Lanni, supra, at 1790. 
12 Nancy J. King emphasizes judicial power even in the colonial period through the 
practice called “benefit of clergy,” which derived from seventeenth-century English law.  
“Clergy was a judicial pardon of sorts,” which rested entirely with the judge after conviction.  
Nancy J. King, “The Origins of Felony Jury Sentencing in the United States, 78 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 938, 948 (2003). 
13 On the absence of federal criminal law, see Sarah Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: 
Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 
41 (1996).  On the fact that jurors were familiar with the law, see Judith L. Ritter, Your Lips 
are Moving . . . but the Words Aren’t Clear: Dissecting the Presumption that Jurors 
Understand Instructions, 69 MO. L. REV. 163, 188-189 (2004). 
14 NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 4-5 (1974); see also Morris B. 
Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003). 
15 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 2, at 915-916 (1994). 
16 Matthew P. Harrington, The Law-Finding Function of the American Jury, 1999 WIS. 
L. REV. 377, 380. 
17 See generally NANCY GERTNER & JUDITH H. MIZNER, THE LAW OF JURIES (2009). 
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difficult in an urbanizing, diverse country.18  Juries became more and more 
passive, deferring to the professional judge.19 
This was especially true by the early twentieth century, when the 
dominant penal philosophy was rehabilitation and an indeterminate 
sentencing regime took hold.20  In indeterminate sentencing, the judge’s 
role was essentially therapeutic, much like a physician’s.  Crime was a 
“moral disease,”21 whose cure was delegated to experts in the criminal 
justice field, one of whom was the judge.  Different standards of proof and 
of evidence evolved between the trial stage and the sentencing stage, 
reflecting the very different roles of judges and juries.22  The trial stage was 
the stage law students studied.  It was the stage of constitutional rights, 
formal evidentiary rules, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  At the 
sentencing stage, the rules of evidence did not apply; the standard of proof 
was the lowest in the criminal justice system: a fair preponderance of the 
evidence.  The rationale was straightforward: it made no more sense to limit 
the kind of information that a judge should get at sentencing to exercise his 
or her “clinical” role than to limit the information available to a medical 
doctor in determining a diagnosis.23 
Unlike other common law countries, appellate review of sentences was 
extremely limited in American courts.24  In the federal system, the “doctrine 
of non-reviewability” prevailed until 1987, when the Federal Sentencing 
 
18 With urbanization, the juries lost their “proximity to persons and events of the cases 
brought before them” and “lost their capacity to inform themselves.”  LANGBEIN, supra note 
4, at 64.  Akhil Amar describes the “present day jury” as “only a shadow of its former self.”  
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 97 (1998). 
19 LANGBEIN, supra note 4, at 64. 
20 See Honorable Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 
ME. L. REV. 570, 571 (2005) (describing the evolution of federal sentencing). 
21 See Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1993). 
22 Gertner, supra note 20, at 571. 
23 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), exemplified this approach.  A jury 
convicted Williams of first-degree murder and recommended life imprisonment.  The judge 
disagreed and sentenced the defendant to death.  While Williams had no criminal record, the 
judge, relying on the pre-sentence report that contained information inadmissible at trial, 
concluded that the defendant had committed a string of uncharged burglaries, that he had a 
“morbid sexuality,” and that he was a “menace to society.”  Id. at 244.  “Retribution is no 
longer the dominant objective of the criminal law,” the Court declared.  Id. at 248.  Rather, 
“reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal 
jurisprudence.”  Id.  Any restrictions upon a trial judge’s ability to obtain pertinent 
information “would undermine modern penological procedural policies.”  Id. at 249-50. 
24 See Comment, Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentence, 46 IOWA L. REV. 159, 
159-60 (1960) (“The federal and majority state rule which precludes appellate modification 
of seemingly excessive sentences within statutory limits seems to be a vestige of the early 
common law doctrine denying any judicial review as of right in criminal cases.”). 
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Guidelines became effective.25  Likewise, only a few states had appellate 
review of sentencing, and even then it was used “sparingly.”26  A trial 
judge’s authority to sentence was virtually unquestioned.  
Consistent with this view of judges as the sentencing experts, Congress 
took a back seat, prescribing a broad range of punishments for each offense, 
and intervening only occasionally to increase the maximum penalty for 
specific crimes in response to public demand.  Judges had substantial 
discretion to sentence, so long as it was within the statutory range.  In 
effect, the breadth of the sentencing range left to the courts the task of 
“distinguishing between more or less serious crimes within the same 
category.”27  While prosecutors had discretion to bring the charges, which, 
given the broad definitions of crimes, was not insubstantial, and defense 
lawyers could argue for creative “therapeutic” solutions, the judge had the 
final word.  And even the judge’s sentence did not fully determine the 
length of time a defendant would serve.  Parole was available depending 
upon the defendant’s conduct while incarcerated. 
To sum up, judges and parole authorities had the most power relative 
to the other sentencing players.  They were the acknowledged sentencing 
experts.  There were few a priori rules or standards.  Each case was resolved 
on its own merits; to the extent there were standards, they evolved from the 
day-to-day experience of sentencing individuals.  There was little or no 
appellate review of sentencing.  And the substantive law of sentencing was 
shaped by rehabilitation, a penal philosophy that necessarily reinforced the 
judge’s role and limited Congress’s and the public’s.  After all, neither was 
in a position to second guess the judge concerning what would rehabilitate 
an individual defendant.  Finally, although federal criminal power was 
growing, most criminal law was state originated. 
As I have written elsewhere,28 there were problems with indeterminate 
sentencing, problems that sowed the seeds of the next institutional shakeup.  
In fact, judges had no training in how to exercise their considerable 
discretion.  Whatever the criminological literature, judges did not know 
about it.  Sentencing was not taught in law schools; and to the extent there 
was any debate about deterrence and rehabilitation—such as on the pages of 
 
25 Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison 
of Federal and State Experiences, 91 NW. U. L .REV. 1441, 1444 (1997). 
26 Id. 
27 KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1998). 
28 See Gertner, Sentencing Reform, supra note 20; see also Judge Nancy Gertner, From 
Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523 
(2007). 
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this Journal—it was not reflected in judicial training.29  “It was as if judges 
were functioning as diagnosticians without authoritative texts, surgeons 
without Gray’s Anatomy.”30 
In the absence of any review, judges had little incentive to generate 
standards for sentencing which might be applied in future cases; few judges 
bothered to write sentencing opinions at all.  Other efforts aimed at guiding 
judicial discretion, or even enhancing judicial decisionmaking, like 
sentencing councils, mimicking the clinical rounds of physicians, or 
sentencing information systems, were rejected.  
Disparity was inevitable, although nowhere near as much as pre-
Guidelines scholarship suggested.31  Marvin Frankel described this period 
as “the unruliness, the absence of rational ordering, the unbridled power of 
the sentencers to be arbitrary and discriminatory.”32  There was no common 
law of sentencing to create precedents to constrain discretion as exists in 
torts or contract.  Without appellate review, no common law of sentencing 
could evolve.  Constitutional review of sentencing decisions was limited; 
Eighth Amendment or due process review was rarely invoked, and even 
more rarely successful.33  Furthermore, Congress had tried—and failed—to 
rationalize the criminal code, as the American Law Institute’s Model Penal 
Code had done with respect to state substantive criminal law.34  The Model 
Penal Code simplified state law, recommending a limited number of broad 
categories based on seriousness (felonies in the first, second, and third 
degrees) and mens rea.  While the Model Penal Code also reflected the 
prevailing views of indeterminate sentencing—the categories are still 
relatively broad and judicial sentencing discretion is explicitly 
acknowledged—it did frame that discretion to some degree by 
systematizing offenses and listing sentencing factors a judge may consider.  
So long as the federal substantive law was chaotic, with overlapping 
categories and muddled distinctions among offenses, federal sentencing was 
bound to seem lawless. 35 
 
29 Stith and Cabranes note that “law faculties had long regarded sentencing as a ‘soft’ 
sub-specialty of criminal law, populated primarily by aficionados of psychiatry, sociology, 
social work, and other such branches of the ‘social’ sciences.”  STITH & CABRANES, supra 
note 27, at 26. 
30 Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 528. 
31 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 111. 
32 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 49 (1972). 
33 Reitz, supra note 25, at 1443. 
34 Kenneth W. Simons, Should the Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be 
Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 179 (2003). 
35 Robert H. Joost, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Is It Possible?, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 195, 202 (1997). 
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III. GUIDELINE MOVEMENT 
In response to widespread calls to reform the indeterminate system, a 
number of states implemented sentencing guidelines.  The sentencing 
guideline approach introduced a new institutional player, an administrative 
agency—the sentencing commission—charged with generating sentencing 
standards.36  The role of the commission, its powers vis-à-vis the other 
sentencing players, and its animating penal philosophy varied from state to 
state. 
In 1984, the federal government entered into the act with a version of 
sentencing reform that by the end of the decade would be widely criticized.  
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), creating the 
United States Sentencing Commission and abolishing parole.37  The 
Commission was supposed to do what Congress had been wholly unable to 
do, namely, to rationalize sentencing free of political influence, separate 
from the ever popular “crime du jour.”  At the same time, the dominant 
penal philosophy changed.  The public, and certain members of the 
academy, gave up on rehabilitation as a central purpose of sentencing,38 
instead championing a philosophy known as “limited” retribution.39  With 
that change, the locus of sentencing expertise moved from the judges and 
parole authorities to the Commission, Congress, and, to a degree, the 
public.  Retribution made sentencing more accessible to the public and, 
ironically, to Congress.  What the crime and the criminal deserved could be 
the subject of debate with the late night talk show host, or in time, the 
blogosphere.40   
To be sure, the institutional implications of the SRA were not 
immediately apparent.  To some reformers, it was not clear whether the 
Guidelines would become a mandatory or an advisory system, or, put 
 
36 See generally Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A 
Comparison of Federal and State Experiences, 9 NW. U. L. REV. 1441 (1997). 
37 18 U.S.C. § 3551--3673 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 991--998 (2006). 
38 See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 
PUB. INT. 22 (1974).  Martinson’s 1974 work was then recanted in his later work, New 
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
243, 252 (1979) (noting that “new evidence” leads him to reject his prior conclusion). 
39 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF HOW WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE 
GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM 14 (2004) (“This approach places primary emphasis on 
punishment proportionate to the seriousness of the crime and, within the broad parameters of 
this retributivism, lengthier incarceration for offenders who are most likely to recidivate.”). 
40 See generally, Franklin E. Zimring, Populism, Democratic Government, and the 
Decline of Expert Authority: Some Reflections on “Three Strikes” in California, 28 PAC. L.J. 
243, 254 (1996). 
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otherwise, whether they would supplement or supplant the judges.41  Where 
the system would land on the continuum from advisory to mandatory would 
have a substantial impact on the institutional division of labor. 
Some who believed that the SRA would herald a truly advisory system 
pointed to such things as the fact that the Guidelines authorized a judge to 
depart from its confines whenever he or she concluded there was a factor 
“of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration” by the 
Commission.42  To others, the Guideline regime was unquestionably 
mandatory, underscoring the fact that the Guidelines were meant to 
determine sentencing outcomes in the vast majority of cases, and judges’ 
power to depart was intended to be exercised sparingly.43 
As a result of various factors, many of which continue to shape the 
debate over sentencing today, the more onerous and mandatory vision of 
the system quickly took hold.44   Meanwhile, Congress, rather than taking a 
back seat to its newly created expert Commission, followed the passage of 
the SRA with a success of even more punitive mandatory minimum statutes 
and “three strikes and you’re out” type sentencing enhancements.  While 
cause and effect may not be clear, the following trends paralleled the 
Guideline movement. 
A. POPULIST PUNITIVENESS 
Crime became the fodder of political campaigns;45 “lenient” judges 
were parodied on the evening news and the bourgeoning 24/7 cable outlets.  
But the popular rage went beyond judges who were supposedly “soft on 
crime.”  Efforts to restrict or even eliminate judicial discretion in sentencing 
paralleled efforts to strip judges of authority in a number of other areas.  In 
1981 and 1982 alone, more than two dozen bills stripping or altering federal 
courts’ jurisdiction were introduced in the Ninety-Seventh Congress.46  And 
the anti-judge, significantly anti-federal judge language was vituperative.47 
 
41 Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 530. 
42 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004). 
43 Judge Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 261, 
267 (2009). 
44 For further discussion of the factors shaping sentencing, see generally Gertner, From 
Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28; Gertner, supra note 43. 
45 Sara S. Beale, What’s Law Got To Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and 
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 49-51 (1997). 
46 This discussion draws on Christopher LeConey, Rhetorical Branding of Judges as 
Outlaws: Recasting the SRA of 1984 as Symptom of the Reagan-Era Anti-Judiciary Zeitgeist 
(on file with author); see also Max Baucus & Kenneth Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their 
Impact on the Constitution, the Courts and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988 (1982); The 
Supreme Court, 1980 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority 
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B. MANDATORY MINIMUMS 
Congress, propelled by this atmosphere, passed a succession of 
mandatory minimum statutes, statutes that were wholly inconsistent with 
the SRA’s approach and surely with deference to the new “expert” 
Commission.  Indeed, over time Congress directly intervened in Guideline 
determinations, ordering the Commission to increase this or that 
guideline.48  Congress’s role grew as the criminal law became more and 
more federalized, now accounting for the prosecution of more and more 
local gun and drug offenses, the kind of street crime that had traditionally 
been the state’s bailiwick.49 
C. THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES 
The composition of the Commission and the guidelines it drafted 
exacerbated these trends.  While the Commission was supposed to be made 
up of sentencing experts,50 the first Commission was not.  Indeed, no one 
on the first Commission had experience in the day-to-day experience of 
sentencing offenders.51  It was, as many described it, political from the 
 
to Regulate the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 18 n.3 (1981) 
(identifying bills introduced in the Ninety-Seventh Congress to strip the federal courts of 
jurisdiction to hear various constitutional claims against state or local officials). 
47 See LeConey, supra note 46.  LeConey cites to Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina 
as stating that: 
Mr. President, unrestricted power has always been the mortal enemy of the rule of law.  In our 
day, we have learned that this is as true in the case of judges as it has been in the case of 
tyrannical kings and communist dictators. . . .  Federal judges have abdicated their role as 
upholders of the rule of law and become instead tyrants who substitute their own personal views 
for law. . . .  Congress fortunately has authority to correct judicial abuses . . .  I urge my 
colleagues to consider the available congressional  remedies and move expeditiously to put them 
into law . . . . [t]he survival of the rule of law is at stake. 
Id. at 1 (citing 128 CONG. REC. 32733-734 (1982) (statement of Sen. Helms)). 
48 Frank O. Bowman III, Pour Encourager Les Autres, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 435-
436 (2004).  See generally Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the 
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 19 (2003). 
49 See James A. Strazzella & William W. Taylor III, Federalizing Crime: Examining the 
Congressional Trend to Duplicate State Laws, 14 CRIM. JUST. 4 (1999); AM. BAR ASS’N 
TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 
15, 27 (1998). 
50 FRANKEL, supra note 32, at 119-20 (explaining that the commission had called for 
only “people of stature, competence, devotion, and eloquence,” in particular, “[l]awyers, 
judges, penologists . . , criminologists . . , sociologists . . , psychologists, business people, 
artists, and . . . former or present prison inmates”). 
51 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 49. 
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start52 and decidedly pro-prosecution.53  Without the patina of real 
sentencing expertise on the Commission, much less real independence, 
Congress had no problem regularly intervening in the Commission’s 
decisionmaking and regularly ignoring it.54 
Additionally, the Commission made a number of problematic 
decisions in its initial drafting that had important institutional 
consequences.  The Guidelines were complex and numerical.  In an effort to 
minimize judicial discretion, they were keyed to the “objective” facts of the 
offense and the offender, such as the quantity of drugs or the amount of loss 
on the one hand and criminal record on the other.  It rejected mens rea, the 
traditional basis for moral culpability, or other factors that judges had taken 
into account in the pre-Guidelines era.55 
And the Guidelines were severe, far more punitive than federal 
sentencing had ever been.  While the Commission claimed to base the new 
Guidelines on existing practice, its data were limited and its analysis 
skewed.  Moreover, it simply took existing sentencing lengths and then 
increased them.  Notably, it chose to use Congress’s mandatory minimum 
sentences as the base levels for the Guidelines, in effect requiring sentences 
even above the levels that Congress had set.56  Indeed, the Guidelines 
resulted in a marked increase in the percentage of all defendants sentenced 
to prison rather than probation, and for markedly longer terms of 
imprisonment.57  The severity of the Guidelines necessarily increased the 
 
52 SENTENCING MATTERS 63 (Norval Morris & Michael Tonry eds., 1996) (“Most 
proponents of guidelines have seen its one-step-removed-from-politics character as a great 
strength. . . .  The U.S. Commission, by contrast, made no effort to insulate its policies from 
law-and-order politics and short-term emotions.”).  
53 Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 763-64 (2005) 
(describing the extent to which the United States Sentencing Commission was “stacked” in 
favor of prosecution interests from its inception and throughout its history). 
54 See id. at 765-69. 
55 See Gerald E. Lynch, The Federal Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Code, 10 FED. 
SENT’G REP., July-Aug. 1997, at 25; Jack B. Weinstein & Fred Bernstein, The Denigrating of 
Mens Rea in Drug Sentencing, 7 FED. SENT’G REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 121.  
56 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, §  3 (2000) (indicating that the 
Commission departed from existing sentencing practice to increase drug sentences because 
of Congressional directives); id. at ch. 1, pt. A, § 4(g) (2000) (indicating that the provisions 
of the Anti Drug Abuse Act of 1986—setting up drug mandatory minimum sentences—
trumped the SRA’s requirement that the Commission consider the impact on prison 
populations); id. § 2D1.1 cmt. background (2000) (describing the relationship between the 
drug base offense levels in the guidelines and the 1986 statute). 
57 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 39, at 46 (“Average prison time for federal 
offenders more than doubled after implementation of the Guidelines.”); see also id. at 43 
(examining the drop in federal sentences to probation); ALLEN J. BECK & DARRELL K. 
GILLIARD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1994 (1995) (discussing numbers of federal 
inmates), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/. 
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power of the prosecutor who could now credibly threaten substantial 
sentences to extract guilty pleas. 
The Commission chose to implement a “real offense” system, which 
allowed a judge to consider additional facts about the criminal conduct of 
the defendant, beyond the offense of conviction, and under the usual 
sentencing standard, a fair preponderance of the evidence.58  Moreover, the 
requirement to consider uncharged conduct that was part of the “real 
offense” led to the requirement that a judge consider even “acquitted 
conduct.”59  While a judge, pre-Guidelines, had the discretion to consider 
uncharged conduct or acquitted conduct, post-Guidelines, it was mandatory, 
and that conduct came to have specific determinate consequences—an 
increase in one’s sentencing score and a concomitant increase in one’s 
sentence.60  And “real offense” sentencing also enhanced the prosecutor’s 
power to determine what to charge and what to leave in reserve for 
sentencing, under a lesser burden of proof and few evidentiary standards. 
And these decisions, effectively out of whole cloth, not correlated with 
the purposes of sentencing on the one hand, or empirical data, on the other, 
had an impact on judges.61  Kate Stith and Jose Cabranes said it best: 
[T]he Guidelines are simply a compilation of administrative diktats.  A set of 
unexplained directives may warrant unquestioning obedience if they are thought to 
constitute divine revelation or its equivalent (the Ten Commandments come to mind), 
but this is not a common occurrence in human affairs—at least not in democratic 
societies. . . .  The Commission’s reluctance to explain itself to the public thus leaves 
us with a set of rules promulgated and enforced ipse dixit—because the Commission 
says so.  In the absence of some reasoned explanation for a particular rule, it is 
difficult to understand, much less defend, the rule.  Unless there is reason to believe 
that the Commission has some unusual capacity to discover important or eternal 
truths, its argument from authority leaves the Guidelines with little or no independent 
validity or legitimacy.62 
 
58 See David Yellen, Illusion, Illogic, and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MINN. L. REV. 403, 418-19 (1993). 
59 Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 48, at 21 (noting that members of the Commission 
could not articulate a philosophy of sentencing to explain the Guidelines’ priorities).  While 
there is no Guideline provision explicitly requiring the consideration of acquitted conduct, it 
is part and parcel of "real offense" and the courts have concluded there is no justification for 
not considering it.  In fact, all efforts to amend the Guidelines to exclude consideration of 
acquitted conduct have failed.  See 57 Fed. Reg. 62,832 (Dec. 31, 1992); 58 Fed. Reg. 
67,522 (Dec. 21, 1993); see also Barry L. Johnson, If at First You Don’t Succeed—
Abolishing the Use of Acquitted Conduct, 75 N.C. L. REV. 153 (1996). 
60 Gertner, supra note 2, at 434.  
61 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 27, at 59-66. 
62 Kate Stith & José Cabranes, Judging under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1247, 1271-72 (1997). 
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D. THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
This quality of the Guidelines—administrative diktats—then had an 
influence on the courts charged with applying them.  As I have written 
elsewhere,63 federal judges at both the trial and appellate levels could have 
played a critical role in mitigating the harsh effects of this Guideline 
system.  They could have created a robust law of departures, or they could 
have critically evaluated them in formal opinions.  Instead, the federal 
judiciary, which had overwhelmingly opposed the Guidelines, suddenly 
became wholly “passive” in their sentencing decisionmaking.64  They 
enforced the Guidelines with a rigor required by neither the SRA nor the 
Guidelines.65  This response was due in part to a continuation of conditions 
that existed prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines, the flaws of the 
indeterminate era.  Judges still lacked training on how to sentence, and 
many did not have backgrounds in criminal justice.  As a result, many 
judges—especially those who arrived on the bench after the Guidelines 
were promulgated—had no perspective independent of the Guidelines and 
no critical context within which to judge the Guideline outcomes.  To them, 
the Guidelines seemed to define the fair sentencing outcome; it was the 
only one they knew.  In part, judges mechanically followed the Guidelines 
because of how the federal guidelines were crafted and sold to them—what 
I have described as a civil code ideology of sentencing reform created by 
the SRA and the Guidelines.66  They believed that experts promulgated the 
comprehensive Guidelines, that they were based on empirical data, and that 
any gaps in their coverage were best filled by the expert Commission, rather 
than by the common law rulemaking of the federal bench.67  They believed 
 
63 See generally Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28. 
64 Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for this Age of Federal Sentencing: The 
Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 93-94 (1999). 
65 See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable 
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1720-21& n.199 (1992). 
66 Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28.  John Merryman’s 
description of civil code judges resonated under the SRA: 
The judge becomes a kind of expert clerk. . . .  His function is merely to find the right legislative 
provision, couple it with the fact situation, and bless the solution that is more or less 
automatically produced from the union.  The whole process of judicial decision is made to fit 
into the formal syllogism of scholastic logic.  The major premise is the statute, the facts of the 
case furnish the minor premise, and the conclusion inevitably follows. 
Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 534 (quoting JOHN HENRY 
MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN 
EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 36 (2d. ed. 1985)). 
67 See United States v. Wilson (Wilson I), 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 915, 920 (D. Utah 2005) 
(noting that the Guidelines are entitled to “heavy weight” because of these assumptions); 
United States v. Wilson (Wilson II), 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005); United States v. 
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this—and many still do—even though these assumptions were flawed, as 
recent Supreme Court case law has suggested.68  The Guidelines’ 
Introduction acknowledges that they are not comprehensive but rather have 
gaps intended to be filled in by judges’ power to depart.69  Nor have they 
been drafted by sentencing experts, at least not the kind of experts 
envisioned by the SRA.  Nor are they based on data or keyed to the 
purposes of sentencing. 
In any event, even though the Guidelines were in fact enforced as if 
they were mandatory, that was not sufficient for some members of 
Congress.  In 2003, Congress passed the PROTECT Act.70  The Act sought 
to eliminate virtually all departures from the Guidelines by creating a 
reporting mechanism for the judges who were not “compliant.” 
The result was a division of labor that gave extraordinary power to 
prosecutors who could effectively determine sentences, either by what they 
charged in the first instance or what they held in reserve for the sentencing 
“real offense” determination.  It also gave power to Congress, which could 
also determine sentencing outcomes through mandatory minimum 
sentences or its edicts to the Commission.  The power of judges to sentence 
was substantially diminished; parole had been abolished since the 
implementation of the Guidelines.  Congress and the Commission became 
the exclusive source of sentencing rules.  While the SRA was supposed to 
implement all of the purposes of sentencing, retribution was in fact the 
dominant philosophy.  And with a growing federal criminal code, the 
federalization of crime, there were few external constraints on Congress.  
Unlike in the states, the federal correctional budget was a fraction of the 
total budget.71 
IV. UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: REENTER THE JURY 
The implementation of the SRA sowed the seeds of a major 
constitutional challenge to the Guidelines.  Under the still broad definition 
of crimes—the chaotic federal criminal code remained unchanged—the jury 
only found facts necessary to delineate the outer limits of punishments, 
 
Jaber, 362 F. Supp. 2d 365, 370-76 (D. Mass. 2005) (criticizing Wilson II); see also Gertner, 
From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, 534-35. 
68 Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009); United States v. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 
85 (2007). 
69 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A1, introductory cmt. 4(b) (2010); 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 cmt.5. 
70 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650. 
71 Frank O. Bowman, Beyond Bandaids: A Proposal for Reconfiguring Federal 
Sentencing After Booker, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 149, 172 n.131 (2005). 
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facts that would trigger the application of the still broad statutory 
sentencing ranges.  Then at the sentencing stage, the judge was obliged to 
make additional findings of fact in order to determine exactly where the 
offender fit in the sentencing grid.  What was becoming more and more 
clear was that the judge was now nothing more than another fact finder, 
rather than a sentencing expert exercising any sentencing judgment, adding 
any kind of expertise.  His or her job was to find facts with determinate 
numerical consequences under the Guidelines, a job which began to look 
more and more like the jury’s. 
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court handed down United States 
v. Booker,72 which held that the Guidelines were unconstitutional because 
of their impact on the jury.  The Court found that the Guidelines violated 
the Sixth Amendment precisely because they obligated judges to find facts 
with the determinate consequences of increasing a defendant’s sentence 
beyond the range required by a jury’s verdict or a guilty plea.73  Suddenly, 
the jury was important in the sentencing division of labor, although as I 
have described, the jury of the twenty-first century looked nothing like the 
powerful colonial jury.  This constitutional defect, according to the Court, 
required severance of the provisions of the SRA that made the Guidelines 
mandatory.74  The Court deemed the Guidelines to be “advisory,” such that 
judges were to “consider” Guideline ranges but were permitted to tailor 
sentences in light of other statutory concerns.75 
In effect, making the Guidelines advisory restored judicial power or 
more specifically, judicial expertise to the sentencing calculus: 
When [sentencing was] indeterminate and juries determined guilt or innocence, judges 
exercised “therapeutic judgment” within the broad limits set by the Congress.  What 
the jury did was different from what the judge did.  As the Guidelines became 
mandatory, what the judge did and the jury began to look alike, finding facts with 
mandatory consequences.  In effect, Booker announced that in order to avoid the 
constitutional consequences of the mandatory regime, the courts had to exercise 
judgment again.  The Guidelines had to be advisory . . . .76 
In particular, a sentencing judge was instructed to follow the SRA’s 
directive to weigh a number of factors, including “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant.”77  The sentencing court was also advised to consider the 
purposes of sentencing listed in the Act, which include not only the 
 
72 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
73 Id. at 237. 
74 Id. at 259. 
75 Id. at 266, 270. 
76 Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence, supra note 28, at 536.  
77 Booker, 543 U.S. at 250. 
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retributive goals concerning the seriousness of the offense, but also the 
prevention of recidivism, the deterrence of future criminality, and the 
rehabilitation of the offender.78 
At first, not much happened.  The trends that predated the decision 
continued afterwards.  Even after the Supreme Court declared mandatory 
application of the Guidelines to be unconstitutional, many judges continued 
to believe in the ideology of the Guidelines and urged continued deference.  
Many judges seemed to be uncomfortable exercising the discretion they 
now had.  Many continued to use the numbers in the Guideline framework 
as a point of reference, illustrating the phenomenon known to cognitive 
researchers as anchoring.79 
But in a series of four cases after Booker, the Court made it quite clear 
that it meant what it had said.  In Gall v. United States,80 the Court held that 
a judge could consider factors, such as offender and offense characteristics, 
regardless of whether they were allowable under the Guidelines.  With 
Kimbrough v. United States81 and Spears v. United States,82 the Court 
indicated that a trial judge could even reject advisory Guidelines based 
solely on policy considerations, such as a conclusion that the applicable 
Guideline did not properly reflect national sentencing data and empirical 
research.  And in Nelson v. United States, in a per curiam decision, the 
Court reversed a within-Guideline sentence, holding that “[t]he Guidelines 
are not only not mandatory on sentencing courts; they are also not to be 
presumed reasonable.”83 
It is too early to say concretely what Booker and its progeny will do to 
the sentencing division of labor.  It is clear that Booker has enhanced the 
position of the judge, whose sentencing expertise has been formally 
acknowledged again, at the cost of diminishing the position of the 
Sentencing Commission.  Booker stripped the Guidelines of the force of 
law, transforming the Commission into a more traditional administrative 
agency, now subject to review akin to that required by the Administrative 
Procedure Act.84  Congress’s role, to a degree, is unchanged, so long as it 
 
78 Id. at 264. 
79 Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 15 YALE 
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 137 (2006), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/50.pdf. 
80 552 U.S. 38 (2007). 
81 552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
82 129 S. Ct. 840 (2009). 
83 129 S. Ct. 890, 891 (2009) (per curiam). 
84 See Kate Stith & Karen Dunn, A Second Chance for Sentencing Reform: Establishing 
a Sentencing Agency in the Judicial Branch, 58 STAN. L. REV. 217 (2005); cf. Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946 § 10, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701--706 
(2006)) (describing the scope of judicial review of administrative decisions). 
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continues to legislate mandatory minimum statutes, although its influence 
on the Commission no longer translates into a direct influence on 
sentencing.  The prosecutor’s role is somewhat diminished to the extent that 
his or her charging decisions are no longer effectively outcome 
determinative.  But given the remaining arsenal of federal offenses with 
mandatory minimum sentences, or enhanced penalties, that reduction is 
hardly substantial.  And the role of the jury, whose diminished position was 
the initial concern of the Court in Booker, has effectively not changed. 
While retribution remains an important purpose of sentencing, the 
other purposes of the SRA—including rehabilitation—have new importance 
in the federal sentencing scheme, making sentencing outcomes more 
complex and, I would argue, far more fair.  Federal judges have an 
opportunity to participate in fashioning new sentencing standards, alongside 
the Sentencing Commission and Congress, although it is not at all clear how 
much they will use their power. 
One might argue that Booker should bring new experts to the 
sentencing system.  It invites scholars, judges, lawyers, and legislatures to 
participate in a multilayered discussion about federal sentencing, a 
discussion that had been largely squelched in an era of Guideline diktats.  In 
fact, it invites just the kind of discussion that this Journal has encouraged 
for the past one hundred years. 
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